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War + peace

SIBLEY-KENDALL

DEBATE

AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY

WAR
&
THE USE OF FORCE

MORAL OR IMMORAL
CHRISTIAN OR UNCHRISTIAN

?

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A DEBATE AT STANFORD UNIVERSITY

WILLMOORE KENDALL

MULFORD Q. SIBLEY

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INTRODUCTION

Crowding Stanford's Memorial Hall, students, faculty, and some residents of Palo Alto felt the excitement of a growing drama publicized as the "Sibley-Kendall Debate On the Use of Force: Moral or Immoral, Christian or Unchristian?" One half-hour before starting time scheduled for seven-thirty, Saturday evening, May 2, 1959, the eighteen hundred seat auditorium was filled to capacity and buildings adjoining the hall were prepared with loud speakers to accommodate the growing overflow crowd. Behind the spot-lighted stage where last minute microphone adjustments were being made no less than six tape recorders were ready to preserve this debate for delayed radio and student audiences.

Meanwhile, in the wings immediately adjoining the stage, participants Dr. Leland Chapin, moderator; Dr. Mulford Q. Sibley, Professor of Political Science at the University of Minnesota; and Dr. Willmoore Kendall, Professor of Political Science at Yale University, were conferring on last minute details and procedure. Shortly after seven-thirty the trio entered the stage and selected chairs facing the audience. Following brief remarks of welcome by a student representative of Breakers, student sponsors of the debate, Dr. Chapin introduced the two speakers.

What were the events leading to the Sibley-Kendall debate? What attraction gathered an overflow audience from the regular Saturday night commercial entertainment to hear professors discuss such a topic? Answers to these questions lie partly in the unique backgrounds and interests of the two speakers, and have beginings in the small mid-western town of Miami, Oklahoma. For it was there Mulford Sibley completed secondary schools and had on some occasions heard sermons by a Methodist minister, the father of Willmoore Kendall.

Dr. Sibley continued his formal education at the Central State College in Oklahoma (B.A. 1933), received an M.A. at the University of Oklahoma in 1934, and completed his Ph.D. in 1938 at the University of Minnesota.

After teaching for ten years at the University of Illinois, Professor Sibley returned to the University of Minnesota to teach in 1948. There he has since risen through the academic ranks and become well known in the field of political and social science for his excellence as a scholar and teacher (he now serves on the editorial board of the *Midwestern Journal of Political Science*) and for his unusual defense of political, religious, and social freedoms. Active in the Pacifist movement during World War II, Dr. Sibley has often been critical of federal defense policy, and actively participates in peace movements and anti-H-bomb demonstrations in cities throughout the country.

In 1952, for his co-authorship of a book titled *Conscription of Conscience: American Conscientious Objectors, 1940-47,* he was awarded the Franklin D. Roosevelt Foundation Prize of the American Political Science Association for the ". . . . best contribution to the study of government in relation to human welfare."

In view of these qualifications as scholar and teacher, when a vacancy occurred on the Stanford Political Science faculty, Dr. Sibley was invited as a visiting professor for the school year 1957-58. Extremely popular with graduate and undergraduate students as well as faculty members for his stimulating teaching, challenging questions, and open-door-at-any time policy for student consultation and guidance, Professor Sibley rapidly became a popular figure on campus, and spoke before many public and student groups during his year at Stanford. As a result of this popularity a student

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movement, sponsored by the Breakers, this year gathered funds to have Professor Sibley return to Stanford from the University of Minnesota for this debate.

Professor Willmoore Kendall's road to the Stanford debate followed a very different path from Mulford Silbey's. After spending his boyhood in several small towns in Oklahoma where his father was an itinerant minister, Dr. Kendall attended the University of Oklahoma (B.A. 1927), Northwestern (M.A. 1928), and then accepted a Rhodes scholarship at the University of Oxford where he also received A.B. and M.A. degrees. While in Europe Dr. Kendall spent several summers and one full year as a U.P. correspondent in Spain shortly before the Spanish Civil War. After returning to this country to complete his graduate work at the University of Illinois, where he received a Ph.D. degree in 1940, he published his most famous scholarly work, entitled *John Locke and the Doctrine of Majority Rule.*

During the World War II Dr. Kendall was active in semi-diplomatic work as a specialist in Latin American affairs and later became Director of the Latin American branch of Central Intelligence Agency. From 1950-53 he directed an Army research project on psychological warfare in the Far East.

In 1947 Professor Kendall began a teaching career at Yale University, where he has since gained stature through his professional articles and books on American government and as associate editor of the *National Review* (which was founded by his friends and former pupils).

Last year Professor Kendall was invited to fill the one-year rotating professorship in political science for the 1958-59 school year. Entering the unusual atmosphere created at the time of Professor Sibley's departure, Dr. Kendall faced a difficult situation, but created a second dramatic year for political discussion at Stanford. Directly challenging liberal ideologies and concepts, Dr. Kendall stimulated student groups to careful study in the work of traditional social thinkers. When invited in April of this year to voice his personal views in a discussion-debate, Professor Kendall accepted the challenge and to the question "Does the Idea of a University Exclude Commitment to Any Political or Social Orthodoxy?", he presented a skillful defense of loyalty oaths. One week later he was speaking before a second capacity audience, at Cubberly Auditorium, on the topic "Should the Christians Run the Universities?", and in a systematic manner outlined his affirmative position.

The stage had now been set and at student invitation both Professor Sibley and Professor Kendall agreed to publicly discuss the issue reported here.

To the Breakers, who made the original Sibley-Kendall debate possible, goes the gratitude of the Stanford student body. To students Dick Noble and Tom Reily who were instrumental in making this publication possible, and to Alan Swallow, editor of the Swallow Press, for completing this pamphlet under most difficult circumstances goes sincere appreciation.

This, then, is a brief review of the circumstances of the debate, circumstances which reflect two lives of study and experience resulting in social and philosophical positions which differ—perhaps not so widely. Professor Mulford Q. Sibley: teacher, scholar, liberal, agitator, Quaker. Professor Willmoore Kendall: teacher, scholar, editor, conservative, Catholic. But prestige, influence, and ideological commitment fail to fully explain the hunger of student audiences for intellectual and social challenges, for the drama of two scholars testing their products in the marketplace of ideas. At least part of the success of the Sibley and Kendall experiences at Stanford reflect an academic sickness which may be diagnosed among other things as *the decline of teaching in the major universities today.* Where are the debates of important social issues which were so common years ago? What has become of the college teacher who counts as success the influence of his teaching on students?

This publication with respect and admiration is dedicated to Professor Mulford Q. Sibley and Professor Willmoore Kendall, two men who still think it important to discuss before students such an important public policy question of today as "The Use of Force: Moral or Immoral, Christian or Unchristian?"

Kent M. Lloyd
Stanford University
May, 1959

FORCE: CHRISTIAN OR UNCHRISTIAN, MORAL OR IMMORAL

WILLMOORE KENDALL

Though I am myself a guest at Stanford, let me add to our moderator's welcome to Professor Sibley, my own: It is always good to see old friends—and Professor Sibley and I have been just that for more than twenty years. It is always good to greet a fellow-townsman whom one has not laid eyes on for a long time—and Professor Sibley is for me just that: many years before we first met, we both lived in Miami, Oklahoma, and my father, if I remember correctly, was pastor of the church Professor Sibley attended as a teen-ager—indeed, since my father, like Professor Sibley, was a persuasive man, and strongly held Professor Sibley's present ideas, he may well have helped to move his youthful parishioner along in the direction that brings him here this evening. Finally, it is always good to see again a fellow-scholar whose work in one's own field one respects and admires and learns from—and Professor Sibley, for me, is just that. I count his friendship an honor; and I count it an honor to have been asked to appear with him on this platform this evening. And I know, perhaps better than anyone else, I who have lived literally in his shadow for an entire academic year, how deeply his teaching, his scholarship and his personality impressed themselves last year on the Stanford campus—know therefore how much reason Stanford has to welcome him back.

Our Moderator has stated for you what let's call our official topic this evening. He has also—and to my great satisfaction—removed what we are about to do from the atmosphere of gladiatorial combat in which a certain organ of the press has placed it, and situated it where it was originally intended to be—namely, in the realm not of debate, but of discussion. Improbable as it may seem to readers of that organ of the press I mentioned a moment ago, I do not like debates—if by a debate we mean the confrontation of two diametrically opposed positions, the trading and parrying of argument and the chalking up of points, in the fashion in which prize-fighters trade and parry blows and chalk up points. I strongly believe that such debates merely confuse issues, that their prevalence in our time is a frightening symptom of a world-wide breakdown of the discussion process, and, most important of all, that our only hope lies in rediscovering the art and ethic of discussion as distinguished from debate—of discussion as, in the first instance, a cooperative quest for common premises from which discourse can begin, and as, in the second instance, a cooperative striving not for triumph over an opponent, but for truth.

I have a second reason for not wishing to think of our business tonight as a debate, which is—and I say it not with a view to prejudicing the result but by way of defining my role as I understand it—this: for me to debate with Mr. Sibley on the topic of pacifism would be to concede what must, for me, be the major point at issue, namely: whether discussion of what the pacifists propose is *possible* between us and the pacifists (I shall say what I mean by "us" in a moment), whether the common premises are present, between us and the pacifists, that would permit discussion to be initiated, whether, in a word, once *we* remind ourselves what *our* premises are, there is anything left for us to say about the doctrine put forward by the pacifists except by paraphrasing what Burke said about the doctrine of the French Revolution, namely: "The body of the people of England have

no share in it. They utterly disclaim it. They will resist the practical assertion of it with their lives and fortunes."

I quote Burke advisedly, because I am going to take him as my model throughout my opening remarks this evening. Just as Burke did not enter directly into debate with the French revolutionaries, so, I repeat, I propose not to enter directly into debate with the pacifists. Just as Burke addressed himself to "we," meaning by "we" the overwhelming majority of the people of Western civilization, past, present, and future, of whom, I take it, this audience is as fair a representative sample as might be brought together anywhere in the United States or Europe. Just as Burke directed attention to a proposal about public policy for England that he viewed with horror because of the consequences to which it would lead if it were adopted, so it is my task to speak of a proposal about public policy for Western civilization that, if adopted, would in my view lead to consequences the mere thought of which strikes terror into the heart. Just as Burke assumed that the question before the people of England was not, "Shall we adopt this proposal?" but rather, "Since we obviously are *not* going to adopt it—any more than our ancestors before us have adopted such proposals when they have been brought forward—let us be clear with ourselves as to why we shall not adopt it, not least of all in the hope that the supporters of the proposal will listen to us as we discuss together, and learn why they should never have brought the proposal forward," so I assume that the result of Western Civilization (and this audience's) discussion of pacifism is not and never has been a foregone conclusion, so that the pacifists among us will remain an insignificant minority, without influence or effect in the sphere of public policy—an insignificant minority in the presence of whom our proper task, alike for their sakes and for our own, is to explain with clarity the grounds on which we must say of their proposal: "The body of the people of Western Civilization have no share in it . . . [We] utterly disclaim it . . . [We] shall resist the practical assertion of it with [our very] lives and fortunes." And as Burke illuminated the grounds for the inevitable rejection of the French Revolutionaires' proposal by asking, "What is it that we in England believe, to what traditional principles do we stand committed, that exclude any save a negative answer to this proposal, and why did our forbears adopt *those* principles rather than some other priciples?", so I shall try to ask and answer the question: "What is it that we in the West have always believed, and that, in consequence, we here in this audience believe, that obliges us to say 'No' to the pacifists' proposals, and why have our minds and hearts always been carried in the direction of *these* beliefs rather than some other beliefs?" Finally, just as Burke would have said to the French Revolutionaries, had they insisted that he meet them on their own ground and debate with them point by point on their own premises, "Sirs, you have lost your sense of the fitness of things: it is you who are burning to persuade us, not we, who have a country to run, who are burning to persuade you; you must, therefore, let *us* choose the terrain on which we are to be persuaded," so we must be prepared to say to the pacifists this evening: "Sirs, we have a civilization to run and, among other things, defend; you wish us —nay, you burn with zeal to persuade us —to run and defend it differently; well, we must insist that you refer your proposal to the premises on which we understand our civilization to rest, that you either prove to us that your proposal is consistent with those premises or, having failed to prove that, agree that we ought to reject it, that, in a word, you meet us on our own ground; and unless you have lost your sense of the fitness of things, you will recognize that that is how the discussion must proceed. For—to paraphrase Burke once more—'We look upon the frame of our civilization, such as it stands, to be of inestimable value'; and

we shall not lightly alter the frame, or risk the civilization."

We are, then, you and I in the first instance not Mr. Sibley and I, going to discuss together the reasons that have led Western Civilization in the past and will lead it, for so long as it exists, to reject the basic proposal of the pacifist. We must assume, therefore (and I do assume it unabashedly) that when we speak of Western Civilization, the "West" as many call it today, we mean something that *exists,* and has existed through a past reaching back at least to Moses and to Homer; something that is, in the last analysis, definable; something that, though it changes, as civilizations must change, remains recognizably itself through its changes. We must assume (again I do assume it unabashedly) that we may properly speak of a *tradition* of Western Civilization, or an *orthodoxy* of Western Civilization—that is, of a complex of beliefs, of commitments, of notions of good and evil, of truth and untruth, of beauty and ugliness, subject, like the Civilization itself, to change, to change moreover that is by no means necessarily always for the better, but again of such character that the complex remains through its changes, has at least remained up to now, recognizably itself. We must assume (and once more I assume it unabashedly) that we most accurately identify the tradition, the orthodoxy, by seeking out those beliefs, those commitments, those notions of good and evil that survive through *all* the changes, so that we are nearest to the core of the tradition when we touch upon those beliefs and commitments and notions of good and evil that a) have perdured in recognizable form over the longest period of time, and b) have proved themselves genuine by being consistently acted upon and, at the margin, fought for. Fought for, I say—now against enemies from beyond the gates of our Civilization, whom by a long tradition and with strict accuracy we call *barbarians,* and now against enemies within the gates, whom by a long tradition we call *heretics.* We assume, finally, that it is part of our business as carriers of Western Civilization to call a spade a spade—even if there are persons present whose experience of Civilization is so limited that they do not know what a spade is, have never had any occasion to call a spade anything, and therefore dislike hearing the word used (as many today dislike such words as "tradition" and "orthodoxy" and "barbarian" and "heretic"—all of which, however, are indispensable for the kind of discussion that we are about to have); even, I say, if there are such persons present, and even if, regretfully, we must injure their sensibilities a little. We must assume these things because they are themselves part of the tradition that they help to define—or, if you like, because they have been taught to us by our experience of Western Civilization, and because Western Civilization is our most sacred and most cherished inheritance. And, having assumed them, we shall have brought out into the open the vocabulary we need—tradition, orthodoxy, barbarian, heretic—in order to let me formulate my major theses in this evening's discussion, which are as follows:

That while there are many variants of pacifism, many forms its proposals may take, many rationales its proponents may put forward, they all have at least this major emphasis in common, namely: they demand the principled rejection of force, of violence, of the recourse to arms, even by legally constituted states attempting to defend their just interests, including survival itself. (We have yet to see which of the many variants Mr. Sibley will urge upon us this evening; how far he will press his own kind of demand for the principled rejection of force in the relations among states, in the relations between governments and individuals and groups within states, in the relations among individuals and groups within states; in what situations, if any, he would permit the use of force; and what new ways he may have found for stating the age-old arguments for the pacifist position, and getting around the objections

that have always led Western Civilization to reject it. We shall, of course, listen attentively as he satisfies our curiosity on these points; but we may, I think, confidently expect the principled rejection of force—not merely by legally-constituted states, but by Western Civilization itself in its current struggle with Communist barbarism—to be the heart of the matter. But back to my theses.)

That pacifism is alien to the tradition of Western Civilization because that tradition is above all a *Christian* tradition and because pacifism is alien to the Christian tradition. That, more concretely, pacifism—though it appeals to the Christian doctrine of love—is the very negation of that love, that is, a manifestation of a kind of self-love that is hostile to the very meaning and heart of Christianity. That pacifism, though it insinuates itself into the body politic as a higher expression of Christian selflessness, is marked throughout by irresponsibility and callous indifference towards the wants and needs and rights of the pacifists' fellow-men. That, finally, so-called *Christian* pacifism (which I take it is what our official topic for the evening points us toward), though often no doubt motivated by a good-will whose roots are indeed to be found in the Christian tradition, is in fact a Christian heresy and, by that very token, a sign of barbarism in our midst.

We shall not, I recognize, understand each other about these theses, about why Christian pacifism must be judged a heresy, until we have said something more about the meaning of orthodoxy—at least this: The mark of a mind civilized by our Christian inheritance and therefore pervaded through and through by *civility*—a term I take from Dr. Johnson—the mark of such a mind, I say, is its ability to entertain intellectually and experience emotionally a complex of propositions whose unity consists, difficult as the idea may be for some persons to grasp, in the very tension among them. We confront here the paradox of intellectual opposites caught up together in a unity that gives vision and therefore peace to the man who possesses it—so that precisely what makes a man an orthodox Christian is his will's assent, under the impetus of the Grace of God, to a vision of reality based upon a fusing of opposites. The man who fails to be moved to that assent by the Grace of God, the man who fails there but is still able to entertain the vision intellectually, is what we may call a civilized unbeliever and not, in our terms, a heretic at all. The heretic is a different kind of man altogether, and his delineation is of central importance for our discussion this evening. The heretic is the man insufficiently civilized to understand—to get through his head—the complex of propositions that make up orthodox Christianity, and are thus a major part of the intellectual inheritance of Western Civilization. He is not, let us note carefully, an unbeliever. The heretic believes, but believes only a portion of the Deposit of Faith; and he believes *this* portion to the exclusion of *that* because (I repeat) he is temperamentally or intellectually incapable of getting hold of that fusion of opposites that is the fullness of the Christian faith.

For example: orthodox Christianity maintained from the beginning that Christ was not a being apart from God and man (as an elf is), nor yet a being half-human and half not (like a centaur) but both at once and both through and through—*very* man and *very* God. The inability to believe this is not heresy, but rather incredulousness. Total rejection of the Incarnation, that is, of the doctrine we have just stated, is easy to imagine in a mind and will annealed in the Judaic experience of civilized order, and is not, therefore, an evidence—if I may invert Dr. Johnson's word—of uncivility. It is easy to imagine also in a mind and will annealed in the Classical experience of civilized order, where again it would not be an indication of uncivility. But it is quite otherwise with the mind and will that partially accepts the doctrine and at the same time partially

rejects it, for here we have a mind and will both inside and outside the Christian experience of the order of being, both inside and outside Christian civilization and, insofar as he is outside, by definition a barbarian. The stigmata by which he is to be recognized are the various forms of the wish to live *off* our Civilization and benefit from the commitments it imposes upon others, but not within them. And since that wish derives from his failure to grasp that complex of propositions, to entertain that paradox, to assent to the mystery inherent in it, he is a double threat to Civilization: he consumes the produce of fields that he does not help to till—that are, indeed, tilled by his enemies; he draws his strength from that which he rejects; and society is the weaker both because of that which he consumes and because of that which he should have nurtured but did not nurture. The heretic is a parasite.

Heretic: barbarian: parasite. That is the profane trinity that sums up the pacifist. Christianity—so Chesterton puts it—taught the lion to lie down with the lamb; but the lion did not thereby cease to be leonine, or become lamblike. The paradox of orthodoxy is this joining together of lion and lamb that remain lion and lamb, of war and peace that are truly war and peace, of violence that is violent and resignation to evil that is resigned. The Christian pacifist, by contrast with the orthodox Christian, seizes upon Christ's injunction to bear evil for His sake, and forgets or ignores or cannot comprehend the massive truth that Christ himself used violence when he scourged the money-changers out of the temple. And that He was fond of the company of Roman soldiers. And that He paid one of His highest compliments to a centurion.

We learn from Augustine that the first serious manifestation of the heresy known as pacifism is to be found in the Manicheans. They, you will remember, insisted that there are two principles in reality, the Good and the Evil; that the material universe is the work of Evil and therefore itself evil warp-and-woof; that whatsoever the body does and suffers has no essential bearing upon what the soul thinks and knows and loves—all of this issuing logically in an indifference towards civil society which in due course hardened into opposition, into obstruction, and, eventually, into hatred. They were, in any case, pacifists, who punctuated lives of lethargic indifference to the world with periodic orgies and excesses and then, pure spirits that they were, denied all responsibility for the consequences of their debauchery. We have it from Waldensis that the Manicheans' pacifism was in due course handed down (which brings it a deal closer home) to Wycliffe, who probably received it from the Catharists, a sect whose doctrine on the evil of marriage struck at the very roots of civilized order and the decency of human love. Also in the fourteenth century, pacifism reared its head in the Rhine Valley, where it signalized the internal breakdown of medieval Christendom and the spread of that religious individualism, the negation of Christian charity, which I believe to be the root—both philosophical and theological—of the pacifist malady; a malady which, accordingly, flourishes where it flourishes. (A great deal of foolishness has been talked, and by persons who ought to know better, about the alleged pacifism of the Early Christians. They did indeed refuse to serve in the Roman armies, but not because they regarded the recourse to arms as evil; rather because as Roman soldiers they would have had to burn incense to the gods. As for the martyrs, they did not, to be sure, resist; but the martyrs were precisely not pacifists but saints, and did not pick and choose among the Beatitudes.)

Let us speak now of traditional Christian doctrine concerning the just war, which we may safely cite as one of Western Civilization's major defenses against the heretical preachments of the pacifists. In brief summary, it runs as follows: The state is a *natural* society; being that, it possesses under natural law the right to

use the means necessary for its preservation and proper functioning. In certain conditions, moreover, the only means by which it *can* preserve itself, or perfect or recover its lawful rights, is war—that is, the recourse to arms. And, given those conditions, it possesses under the natural law the right and the duty to wage war.

The traditional reasoning here has as its underpinning, let us notice at once, a profound metaphysics of Being itself, and one that has nowhere been better articulated than in Abraham Lincoln's blunt assertion that "No state voluntarily wills its own dissolution." The state—so runs the reasoning—has as its end the common good of its citizenry; it therefore is an order of Being, and of the being appropriate to a complex relationship. To say that it must not have recourse to armed might even when its existence is threatened by aggressors from without or within is, in other words, to demand that *an order of Being voluntarily will its own nothingness;* and such a demand is contrary to the structure of reality itself. As Thomas Aquinas puts it: every order of Being, and every being as well, *by its very nature* strives to keep itself in being. As Paul Tillich puts it, Being identical with it own power to be, its own affirmation against its own nonbeing. In a word: when we say that the lawfully-constituted state must bare its neck to the executioner, must do so though it exists to promote the common good of its citizenry, we as good as say that reality must have a tendency towards non-reality, that existence is one with nothingness. The pacifist in his heresy approaches the heresy of the suicide, and both are powerful artillery pieces trained upon the structure of existence itself. The Jewish tradition of Spinoza, the Catholic tradition of Aquinas, and the Protestant tradition of Tillich are all at one in this conception of the fundamental metaphysics. And the fact that they are at one bespeaks an orthodoxy common to the *entire* West, and it is the essence of pacifism, a doctrine so irresponsible that it refuses to salute even the Flag of Being, that it represents a sharp break with that orthodoxy. It is the Jehovah's Witness *par excellence.*

Let us put the point a little differently: A state which will not wage war in any circumstances, however serious, would condemn itself, we are saying, to extinction. Now: if the natural law demanded that, then God, who is the Author of the natural law, would both *will* and *not will* political society. He would will its end, and at the same time forbid it the means *necessary* for attaining that end, and we say "necessary" because the state that cannot protect the life, liberty, and property of its citizens fails in its appointed function. If, therefore, the state can sometimes perform its function only through the use of force, it must have the right to use force. And, naturally enough, the common orthodoxy of the West has always maintained that among the most precious rights of man is the right to go to war.

In this context, we readily see what is wrong with pacifism as a doctrine. If the pacifist were merely an opponent of militarism, of the use of aggressive war as an instrument of imperialistic expansion, the West would not always have turned a deaf ear to him. But the pacifist contents himself with nothing so modest or sensible: he condemns *all* war, even defensive war, and in doing so logically plunges himself into anarchism—an anarchism which, implicitly and often explicitly, wills the nothingness of civil society. This is a nihilism as dangerous as that of *Zarathustra*—nay, more dangerous, be cause it masks itself under the cloak of the very Christian responsibility that it denies.

Let us, however, pass on to another chapter of our topic: War, says the common tradition of Western Civilization, is not only *not* intrinsically wrong; it is very often intrinsically right, intrinsically moral. This also emerges from the doctrine of the just war—the conditions for which, under natural law, are as follows: 1) The just or legitimate war must be declared by a lawful authority.

(Killing, the doctrine teaches, is clearly wrong when the killer is an individual acting in a private capacity, though no longer wrong when the killer kills in self-defense against private aggression. As for the soldier, he has a clear right to kill when he acts as the legal and publicly-designated agent of his country in the prosecution of a just war; and even public designation is not necessary if the war is a purely defensive one.) 2) Resort to force is permitted only on behalf of a just cause, where we must confess at once that the definition of just cause has given rise to very considerable differences of opinion, though not so many as to prevent our pointing to certain just causes about which there has been general agreement, namely: that of the state that is fighting for its very existence; that of the state which moves to recover that which is rightfully its own; and that of the state whose honor has been wounded so grievously that inaction would plead it guilty of cowardice in the eyes of the world. 3) The use of force is permitted only as a *last resort.* Before a nation launches its just war, that is to say, it must have exhausted every peaceful means consistent with its dignity: negotiation; mediation; arbitration; diplomatic pressure; economic sanctions; ultimata—in a word, every means short of war known to enlightened statesmanship. Otherwise, the doctrine holds, there exists no clear proof that the war is unavoidable, and that there is a proper relation between the good hoped for from the war and the means of achieving that good. 4) The state resorting to war must have a *fair hope of success.* Here again, however, the doctrine is not entirely clear, since it recognizes that there are times when men are so pressed—or oppressed—that resistance, even hopeless resistance, is the only means by which men can preserve their common dignity. By signing history with their heroism, as the Hungarians did yesterday and the Tibetans are doing today, noble men not only go to God but remind other men everywhere of what it means to be a man. To die on the streets of Budapest, a machine-gun in hand, is not only to save one's dignity and therefore one's soul; it is to offer an example to a timid and even cowardly world, and such a death, the tradition recognizes, may express a love that passes all understanding, "Greater love hath no man," it says than "that he lay down his life for his friend." The Hungarian freedom fighters, I like to think, died not only to save themselves, but to save us; their names should pass into the speech of all whose tongues still utter decency in a disintegrating world. The doctrine teaches, finally, that 5) even a punitive war, a war undertaken to punish a guilty nation, may be a just war. Right order and the future peace of the world may well demand, for example, that gangster nations not be permitted to commit mass-murder with impunity—that, rather they be taught a lesson in morals here and now. (There is, however, no blanket authorization in this regard: the right to wage a punitive war may well be counterbalanced by other considerations. The remitting of punishment, for instance, which is an act of mercy, might in certain circumstances be the higher duty.)

This traditional Christian doctrine, which I repeat, is that of the whole Western heritage, has both restrained the arrogant and given spirit to the timid. It has been articulated step by step, *within* the Christian West and *nowhere else*—which suggests, if it does not prove, that its roots are in the Christian experience itself. It owes as much to philosophic reason as to Revelation, and thus illustrates the Christian baptism of the Greek philosophical experience. It is of crucial importance for the preservation of Western civilization, and only a man weary of both the burdens and the glory of the heritage of that Civilization would seek to undermine it or call it into question. And that is the point about the pacifist; he *is* weary, and weary of both the burdens and the glory; and the consequences of his abdication of responsibility are

visited not so much on *him* as on his society or civilization.

Let me make that clear: If the Christian pacifist were an isolated Ebenezer in a frontier society, we could let Bill take care of him—as Bill does in Hilaire Belloc's delightful refrain:

> Pale Ebenezer thought it wrong
> to fight;
> But roaring Bill who killed him
> Thought it right.

But the Christian pacifist is *not* a pale Ebenezer, who seraphically turns his face towards a lonely aggressor. He is a heretic within a society that his actions weaken and, were they to be multiplied, would destroy. The only thing to do with him is to unmask his pretentions, if only to be done with his constant moralizing. Unmask them how? One possibility would be for us to imitate Hilaire Belloc's delightful Bishop of old Auxerre, who:

> . . . With his stout Episcopal staff
> So thoroughly thwacked and
> banged
> The heretics all, both short
> and tall,
> They rather had been hanged.
>
> Oh, he thwacked them hard,
> and he banged them long,
> Upon each and all occasions,
> Till they bellowed in chorus,
> long and strong,
> Their orthodox persuasions!

But however we unmask him, unmask him we must, and soon. Appealing as he does from the doctrine of brotherly love and Christ's injunction to "turn the other cheek," he has confused them both and confused them badly.

Let us think togther for a moment about that injunction to "turn the other cheek," and let us go again for assistance to Thomas Aquinas—not of course because of his supposed authority, but because his teaching on the matter appears to have imbedded itself deep in the conscience of Western civilization, to have entered into and become part of the Western way of life, and to have determined the behavior of countless millions of Westerners—countless millions who certainly could not have put the teaching into words, but have not, for that reason, acted upon it any the less surely or any the less confidently. Who, asks Thomas Aquinas, has the *right* to turn the other cheek?—not, mind you, the duty, but the *right,* since unless we have the right we clearly cannot have the duty. Who has the *right* to submit to unjust aggression? And Aquinas answers: "Only the man upon whom no higher responsibility falls; only the man who owes no other duty, in justice or in charity, to a friend or a wife or a child or a society that would be adversely affected by the aggression." Now: let us *arguendo,* grant that such an isolated man, a man liberated from the responsibilities that normally attach to the Christian way of life in society, might exist; Thomas wishes us to ask farther: "Does even he have the right to turn the other cheek?" And we get not a "Yes" answer but a "Yes, but" answer: Yes, but not always, not in all circumstances: such a man has the right to turn the other cheek *only if his act of submitting to the aggressor will, or possibly could, deter the aggressor from his evil act;* only if his act of bearing injustice for the sake of Christ may become a symbol of righteousness that might sign itself within the conscience of the aggressor. Then, and then only, says Aquinas, ought the Christian to refrain from resistance. If non-resistance clearly cannot affect this end—as who but the pacifist supposes it could against a Hitler, or against the disciplined hordes of World Communism—if non-resistance cannot effect this end, then resistance becomes a duty—not primarily as a means by which the man unjustly attacked may save himself, but as a means of preventing the aggressor from carrying out his act and, by striking back, teach the bully a lesson. Given the circumstances, resistance would be demanded by the

law of Christian love itself. In a word: I ought to be concerned enough about the moral and spiritual health of my enemy *to fight him for his own good!* And the principle is, I repeat, important for "we" not because it is Aquinas', but because it is and will continune to be the rule of action of that Western Civilization on which, as I began by saying, "*we*" place inestimable value. It is, for example, the rule of action that sent us out to destroy the abomination known as Nazism; and, as *we* know, it has much further work to do.

The issue of pacifism, let me repeat, is less important for us tonight than the locus in which it is argued. And the point to grasp becomes this: the reasoning on which the doctrine just summarized rests itself moves from a spiritual emphasis that is unknown to and unknowable by the pacifist. It originates in what Sombert and Weber and Dawson call the "ec-static" structure of Christian Love, which is a love that seeks not the *self* but the *perfection of the other;* a love so strong that, as we have just seen, it will strike a man down in order that he may rise up the better for the blow! And we cannot, I think, overemphasize the fact that modern Christian pacifism grew up within the climate of that Christian individualism which is an utter distortion of the meaning of Christian love. Should we seek its origins, or at least its earliest full expression, we might well look to that same Rhine Valley gnosticism that produced both Mennonite pacifism and Thomas a'Kempis, whose *Imitation of Christ* preaches, as "we" know, a strange new doctrine of Christian perfection. It holds that I am called to love my neighbor because God has thrown him my way as an occasion, as an instrument, for *my own perfection.* Its emphasis is, clearly, upon the self. It teaches a *self-centered Christianity,* the essence of which is that it would sacrifice society, even the life of one's own sons and daughters, on the altar of personal perfection, and this for the sake of personal identification with a misunderstood ideal of the Christian life. Such a Christianity inverts not only the psychological and theological but also the ethical dimension of the human spirit. And the ideal that it distorts, the true ideal of Christian love and thus of Christianity itself, is that caught up in St. John's magnificent injunction: "As the Father so loved you that He gave you His only Begotten Son, so do you love the world." The orthodox Christian loves the other —including his enemy—not because *he* will thereby be perfected, but because the other so needs his love; and in the background of this ec-static doctrine of love, Christ's injunctions to bear suffering and to turn the other cheek take on a transcendent meaning that is one with the sacrifice, even unto death, demanded by the Christian life. When resistance to aggression is the only means whereby I can cure a man of evil, then the love I own him *demands* that I resist him. The sword ought to be taken up in love; and Chesterton is there to remind us that the cross and the sword are, paradoxically, the same symbol, pointing to the same Reality.

Another point or two, and I shall have done. The pacifist insists that Christian history fails to reveal any instance of a war's having achieved the ends for which it was waged. The assertion is altogether false, of course, in its understanding of the history of the West. To take the simplest and most obvious cases: Had Charles Martel—the *malleus hereticorum* —not taken up the sword against the Mohammedan barbarians, the crescent and not the cross would surely be planted where today there stands Notre Dame de Paris. Had Charlemagne not hurled back the Germanic pagans to the East, we might well be worshipping Odin and Thor and living in a forest of barbarism and blood. Had Don Juan of Austria not turned back the Turks at Lepanto, and had not John Sobieski halted the Turks at Vienna, our civilization would have gone down in a twilight of the gods that would have left the world empty of decency and bereft of law. These men are

the heroes of our cradles; tales of their valour have always been the substance of the childhood dreams of Christian men everywhere. And "we" of the West value our Marlboroughs and George Washingtons—value them, and revere their memories, as we value and revere the memories of our Beethovens and our Shakespeares; each has contributed a kind of knowledge and a kind of devotion without which the West could not have become the West as we know it.

It is objected that the medieval Church forbade the taking up of arms by clerks regular and secular, and on the ground that hands that consecrate at the altar ought not to be stained by blood. Indeed it did; but let no one try to transform this into a leg for pacifism to stand on. The leading theologians of the period are at one in justifying and praising (as well they may!) those religious orders whose mission was the defence of the Holy Places against the Barbarians. The position is crystal-clear: for the "defence of religion and public safety" and out of love for "the poor and the oppressed," men of God were raised up who carried shields and lances; and the tradition approved—as approve it must in view of the leading of Ambrose, who praised those who would defend the fatherland against barbarians; those who would shield the hearth against thieves; those who would stand as living swords between murderers and persons who are sick and infirm. And Ambrose praised them precisely because of their love of *justice*.

Christian love—it is this which is the strength of pacifism, and it is this which makes of pacifism a peculiarly hideous heresy. For its love is a pale and fraudulent imitation of the real thing. It loves neither its enemy nor its friend, neither society nor home. To its claim that peace is its end, we answer with Augustine that peace really, and knows it to be inseparwith Christ that "I bring you not peace, but a sword." Peace is something waged for, fought for; and the reason our world today may well find itself forced to wage war again is not that it cannot rise to the pacifist love of peace, but that it loves peace really, and knows it to be inseparable from the obligation to maintain order. To the pacifist charge that war today may well bring total destruction, orthodoxy answers that the decision as to whether the planet and human existence are to be destroyed is God's affair, not ours; He has made it *our* business not to make policy for the universe but to protect justice and law and liberty, and this out of love for our neighbor. Again a teaching of Aquinas that has entered into the conscience of the West drives the point home: Even if I knew infallibly, Auqinas argues, even if I knew by a Revelation of God that my efforts to save my dying father were doomed to failure, that God Himself had willed my father's death, it would not affect my obligation to try to keep him alive. In a word: God's will for me would remain what it was before the Revelation, namely, that I live up to my obligations. God may have willed the detruction of the planet in an atomic *Gotterdämmerung* (I do not know, of course, and can never know); but "we" are still obligated to use the means at our disposal in order to preserve justice in the situations in which "we" are involved, *to fulfill our duties in all their concreteness and detail.* That preserving, that fulfilling, is God's will for us, and whatever else He may have willed as a consequence of what we do is, I repeat, *God's* business and not *ours.* In acting accordingly we would have behind us the full weight of the only tradition—the Christian tradition—that has made life bearable for man within time.

The temptation to give way to the pacifists—who have now added to their other skills a mastery of what let's call the art of nuclear-weapons blackmail—is very great, and great especially in those quarters where the Scripture the pacifist diabolically cites is held in contempt—except, of course, as a stick with which to beat non-pacifist Christians over the head on occasions like this evening. The temptation, I say, is very great; it will

become greater as time passes; it will be at its greatest on that future day when the Soviet Union delivers to *us* the ultimatum that, back in 1946, we should have delivered to *it*. The thought of surrender on that day—not, I repeat, on Christian pacifist grounds, but out of sheer funk—is indeed present in the atmosphere, is already sapping our national will to resist the Communist enemy, is already pushing further and further into the future the moment when we shall discover, not too late, I hope, that our duty to strike down the Soviet aggressor, our duty to prevent him from doing the wrong he is doing, is not different from but identical to the duty we shouldered a few years ago with respect to the Nazis; and not less urgent, but infinitely more urgent.

Christians themselves may come to feel the temptation—not, as today, in small numbers, but in the large numbers that are the stuff of the so-called Christian pacifist's dreams. And "we" must say to them: you must *resist* the temptation. Let me, this once more, fall back on Chesterton: "It is easy to be a madman; it is easy to be a heretic. It is always easy to let the age have its head; the difficult thing is to keep one's own. . . To have fallen into any of those open traps of error and exaggeration which fashion after fashion set along the historic path of Christendom—that would indeed have been simple. It is always simple to fall; there are an infinity of angles at which one falls, only one at which one stands. To have fallen into any one of the fads . . . would indeed have been obvious and tame. But to have avoided them all has been one whirling adventure; and in my vision the heavenly chariot flies thundering through the ages, the dull heresies sprawling and prostrate, the wild truth reeling but erect."

FORCE AND WAR: POLICY, MORALS, CHRISTIANITY

MULFORD Q. SIBLEY

We live in an age of violence. Men not only tend to think of violence as inevitable but also to believe that it may be—as a last resort, of course—the only road to peace and freedom.

Many statements in connection with the so-called Berlin crisis imply that it may lead to war and that war, somehow, in some vague way, may have to be used to protect Western civilization. Thus Senator Jacob Javits said recently: "I don't like to risk a big war, a little war or any kind of war, but we have to run risks if we want to have world leadership and keep the world at peace." And Senator Hubert Humphrey has asserted that the Berlin crisis is "one of the most serious critical situations that we have ever faced." "This does not mean," he goes on, "that it will result in war, but war is not to be ruled out . . . " Senator Henry Jackson maintained in a radio address that there has been too much talk about Berlin "and not enough quiet military building, which the Soviet leaders understand far better than talk."[1]

President Eisenhower has perhaps best reflected both our feelings of repulsion with respect to war and at the same time our attraction to violence as in some unexplained fashion a final answer to our dilemmas. After pointing out in his March 16 television address that "the American and Western peoples do not want war," he went on to say: "But all history has taught us the grim lesson that no nation has ever been successful in avoiding the terrors of war by refusing to

defend its rights . . . " And his implication was that "defense" of rights might have to be by war.

As a matter of fact, the central faith of American foreign policy today seems to be in the threat of mass violence.

Ideologically, the so-called democracies and the so-called communist societies join hands in this faith, despite attempts to differentiate their positions. Professed followers of Jesus and avowed disciples of Karl Marx are at one here, whatever may be their important differences in other respects. And the President of an allegedly non-violent India—a personal disciple of the late Mohandas Gandhi—presides over a State budget one half of which is devoted to preparations for mass violence.

So hypnotized are we by the attractions of violence, even while another part of our being seems repelled, that we almost never ask in any fundamental way whether or to what degree force and violence can be justified morally. While the headlines scream about the missile and anti-missile and anti-anti-missile gap, we appear to take for granted that the heaping of missile on missile can in fact "preserve democracy."

It is our purpose this evening to ask basic questions about these issues. And however conflicting our answers may be, we shall, I trust, get beyond cliches.

My own position is what is often described as a pacifist one—although that term is sometimes used to designate rather diverse attitudes. Over-all, I hold that violence is to be distinguished from non-violent force, that war is both immoral and inexpedient; that violence cannot preserve or protect democracy, peace, and freedom; that the United States should, if it accepted these principles, disarm immediately and develop realistic methods of defense; that while the so-called Christian tradition as a whole is somewhat muddy and confused on these questions, the spirit of the Gospels is essentially a pacifist one; and that, entirely apart from formal religion, one ought as a civilized human being to be a pacifist.

In order to suggest more fully the basis for this position, let us examine (1) the nature of the question as a part of the broad problem of human conduct and morals; (2) the varieties and contexts of "force" and the meaning of "violent force"; (3) the problem of war as an example of violent force; and (4) the relation of the question to the so-called Christian ethic.

(1) *The Nature of the Question.* The question we are discussing is, of course, one aspect of the general problem of human conduct. How shall we act with reference to our neighbors? What are our obligations to men and mankind as a whole? What are our obligations to the State? How ought States to act in their relations with one another?

(a) Now in dealing with any question of morals, we must begin by discovering and stating general principles and what these principles are will depend upon our values and upon our assessment of the possible and probable consequences of given acts. However we may account for our values—whether by intuition, revelation, or "reason" in the natural law sense of the term—our statements about them will take the form of varying levels of generality and occur in the context of other and apparently conflicting values. Thus we may begin with the judgment "human life is sacred" but we cannot stop there; we must also be aware simultaneously of such judgments as those which forbid lying, inculcate defense of the right, and command the enhancement of freedom and responsibility. "Freedom is good" may in given circumstances seemingly require that human life be sacrificed; or contrariwise, it may appear that "freedom"—itself an ambiguous term—may have to be sacrificed to the preservation of life, or at least of most lives.

We must always be prepared, in the statement of our principles, to suggest which values stand higher in the event

of an apparent clash in practice. It would seem to be inevitable that our value statements must be arranged—at least from the human point of view—in some kind of a hierarchy.

(b) But however nicely we work out our principles and however carefully graded our value heirarchy may be, principles can never be more than general guides for specific conduct. The acid test comes when we endeavor to apply our principles to actual cases; for the particular application of principles involves judgments of consequences and each case is in some respects unique (as the lawyers discover to their great sorrow). The medievalists used to observe that every conscience has its casuistry (its cases where general principles have to be applied to concrete and complex situations). Thus one of my acqaintances—a French Protestant pastor—rescued scores of Jews from the Nazis during World War II, hiding them in his attic on their road to complete liberation. He was then confronted by the question of what he should tell the police when they began their search. Should he tell the truth about the Jews secreted in his house—and thus probably assist in sending them to their death? Or should he, on the contrary, try to lie as best he could and thus conceivably save them? In either event he would seemingly be violating commandments which he upheld in his Sunday sermons. Could he escape the dilemma simply by saying "I refuse to say one way or another whether I have Jews?" If he did that, he would have to predict the effect of the evasion on the police as well as its possible consequences for the hidden Jews. Nor could he turn to the New Testament and find a clear answer. No course of action seemed to him completely satisfactory from a moral point of view. But he finally decided that he must lie as persuasively as possible and hence even went to the length of systematically instructing his children how to tell falsehoods to the police in the most effective way. After the war, he justified his action as being the best possible application of his principles under the circumstances.

The relation of conscience to casuistry is thus one of attempting to be clear about one's general value structure and then of looking at the case in hand as discriminatingly as possible and with the understanding that one's conclusion will not always completely satisfy.

It is an understatement to say that ethics is not an exact science (I am tempted to say that only medicine is more inexact) and that its application to cases of conscience is not infrequently one of groping around in the darkness for the little light which may be present. How can one determine accurately the remote consequences of an act? Yet how can one call a given course of conduct "right" or "wrong" without taking consequences into consideration? How can an act be sharply separated from its consequences? It is questions of this kind which the moralist will always be asking himself, the political moralist no less than he who concerns himself primarily with personal conduct.

Any answer to the question of the legitimacy of force and war must, therefore, be given within the framework of an uncertainty characteristic of moral science as a whole. The context of both "value" structures and "fact" relationships must be examined. We must not expect too much of our inquiry, however deeply we feel that our answer is the right one (as I do). On the other hand, the difficulties of conscience and its casuistry do not justify our evading the issues involved and certainly do not warrant our failing to act on the conclusions we reach. While we should always stand ready to re-examine our conclusions, we must, as morally responsible beings, act on them so long as we hold them to be right.

(2) *The Varieties and Contexts of Force.* In the light of these observations, let us now turn to the problem of force.

It is striking to note the many ways in which the word is used. It is closely connected with "constraint"; and "coercion"

is either its synonym or a closely related notion. In our ordinary language, we speak of the "coercion of reason," the "force of example," the "force of mind." Similarly, we talk of the "compulsion of the right or good," "psychological force," "physical force," and, in the late Mohandas Gandhi's expression, "soul force."

We distinguish between and among the several kinds of force not only because accurate description seems to require that we do so but also, it seems to me, because we are always seeking at least tentative classifications for purposes of moral evaluation. Most of us hold that an ideal person would be one subject to the pressure or force of "reason" or "right" alone. If we imagine a situation in which all men and groups would act solely under the pressure of "good," "right," and "reason" and furthermore assume that there is but one "reason, right, and good" completely comprehended by all, the problem of so-called "external coercion" would not arise. Obviously a situation of this kind never exists in any complete or even approximately complete sense. Actual social life is in considerable measure filled with "external" coercions, pressures, and intimidations of various kinds—the pressures of economic competition, for example; the frustrations inherent in group life; the externally imposed discipline of the home; the several kinds of so-called "police" action; and threats to use physical force at all levels, including the international. We are all, moreover, born into a society which we did not shape and are molded by that society to such an extent that we often never rise above it sufficiently to be able to criticize it.

Until that day arrives when our insights into universal right and reason are uniform and clear, we are condemned to live in a world where groups, individuals, and the "State" use divers kinds of pressure on one another in the name of their respective conceptions of right, or, in some instances, simply use the several kinds of force unreflectingly and without reference to any explicit notion of right.

On the other hand, we should not exaggerate the degree to which we lack agreement or consensus. At the very general level, for example, there is an impressive agreement. In the abstract, for example, both Christians and Communists would probably assent to the proposition that human life should be regarded as an end; that the several kinds of force should be used only within prescribed limits—the limits to be fixed by our experience as to how we can use the force most effectively for the achievement of accepted ends with a minimum violation of other values; that the *level* of human life ought to be raised both materially and culturally. The propaganda on both sides in the so-called Cold War appeals to very much the same kind of abstract value structure—both sides speak glowingly of liberty, for example, and both appeal to the ideal of brotherhood.

Now these general value statements are not meaningless. The ideal of equality, for example, however vague it may be, has exercised, if Gunnar Myrdal[2] be right, a potent influence in creating an uneasy mind and a dynamic for change with respect to race relations in the United States; and the conception or improvement in material well being has been profoundly instrumental in attaching both the United States and the Soviet Union to the ideal of a technologically advancing civilization.

Even when one turns to the more specific implementation of commonly held ideals, there is a larger degree of at least verbal agreement than is sometimes realized. Thus mankind everywhere profess to repudiate war for the achievement of their ends. The fact that leaders universally appeal to their alleged "peace" principles means that "peace" itself is both an ideal and a practice highly valued by men.

I call attention to this widespread agreement on social and political ideals and even practice to show that, in our verbal statements at least, we tend to maintain, however vaguely, that the several kinds of external force should not be

regarded as ends in themselves and that, where they are employed, they should be used only within certain prescribed limits. While the limits may not always be precisely defined—although the history of criminal law is one of attempting greater and greater precision—the idea of limits is one firmly fixed in the ethical consciousness of mankind.

Now with most of these abstract ideals I find myself in agreement and I think also that when one *does* utilize force it ought always to be within definite limits —moral or legal—so that the means used will not tend to destroy the end to be achieved. Most of us would agree, I think, that arming our municipal police with atomic machine guns would not be permissible; for while it might enable the police to defend themselves against alleged criminals, it would also make almost certain the killing of innumerable innocent people and thus frustrate an important end for which the police presumably exist—the protection of human life.

It is within some such context, then, that we should look at the problem of force in human affairs. We cannot answer the question "Is force moral or immoral?" without examining the kind of force employed, the context within which it is administered and the probable overall consequences of its use. We must, moreover, keep constantly in mind the ends and values in the name of which the use of the several kinds of force may be justified.

Given this framework, I do not think that any general moral distinction betweent "physical force" and "non-physical" force, as such, can be supported. "Physical force" covers a wide variety of human acts the characteristics of which would seem to put them in quite separable moral categories, depending not merely upon intent and motivation (which must always be considered) but also upon the consequences and context of the force. Thus when I rescue my irrational little boy by force from the path of an onrushing automobile, I am using "physical force" and I am also employing "physical force" when I wipe out Moscow through the use of two or three hydrogen bombs. Surely our moral judgment of the two acts must in part depend upon such contextual factors as the probable controllability of the force for the ends we are pursuing; the likelihood or unlikelihood that the force used will set in motion consequences which we would not will (even though incidentally it might also achieve our immediate objective) ; the probability or unprobability that the force utilized might lead to the destructive use of counter-force; and the effect of the persistent use of the force, under the circumstances obtaining, on our own moral sensitivity.

Non-physical force, too, may or may not be compatible with the achievement of morally desirable ends. Persistent psychological force may kill the human spirit and non-physical pressures may lead to a disintegration of personality. At the same time, nonphysical force may be a morally legitimate way in which to achieve objectives without violating the canon of respect for human life and the command that we raise life to higher and higher spiritual and cultural levels. We speak of the "force of example," for instance, as having a capacity for arousing men to their moral and political obligations—a Socrates, a Jesus, a St. Francis, a Gandhi. A strike, too, *may be* (depending upon the whole context) a morally inoffensive method—at least relatively so —for certain kinds of morally approved ends. It may arouse the conscience of both the community and the employer or compel the sometimes arrogant employer to consider seriously the claims of the worker. Majority rule, also, is a form of coercion which, because of its relatively non-injurious nature and within the limits of consensus on basic values, may be approved.

In sum, if we conceive of force in the way suggested here, there is a continuum from non-violent, or relatively non-injurious types of force at one end to increasingly violent, injurious kinds at the

other. On the first side, one would find the "force" of reason, of right, of personal example, of majority rule, of mild punishment, of discriminating physical force, of the strike, and, often, of civil disobedience. Of no one of these could one say that it is under all circumstances "right." Rather we should assert that it is more capable, on the basis of our experience, of being used without destruction of human life (a prime value in my scheme of values) and less likely under most circumstances to lead to consequences antagonistic to such basic ends as the achievement of political freedom, the preservation and enhancement of human life, and the maintenance of moral sensitivity. To demonstrate this in detail would require much more time than we have available in this discussion.

At the other end of the continuum will be those types of force which I shall designate as "violent"—capital punishment, for example, and torture, and propaganda which uses deliberate deception, and the institutional practices which we sum up under the word "war."

It is not always easy to discern just where the line between "non-violent" and "violent" force should be drawn; and there is a point, no doubt, where non-violent forms of force shade off into violent expressions. But the fact that at a certain point on the continuum the line is difficult to draw is no argument against our attempting to draw it; indeed, as responsible beings, we *must* draw it, however tentatively. Violent force is illegitimate morally and its illegitimacy is revealed in its consequences which, on the whole, tend to destroy what we are seeking: the enhancement of life, the enlargement of freedom, and the ultimate disappearance of external force in human relations.

Moreover, at one end of the continuum, the *quality* of a given act of force can be sharply differentiated from the *quality* of an act at the other end. This is recognized by our criminal law, for example, when it permits "reasonable" and controlled corporal punishment of children within the home but—at the other end of the scale—forbids a man to express his personality through the act of force known as rape. Or let me illustrate in terms of the pacifist's response to a typical question still put by non-pacifists: "What would you do if a man should suddenly attempt to rape your wife?" The pacifist might answer: "I should attempt to restrain him, by physical force if necessary. But what has this to do with war?"

(3) *The Problem of War.* This takes us squarely into our third issue—that is, the legitimacy of war and one's obligations with respect to the war-making State.

In the interests of conceptual clarity, we should first of all point out that the term itself is used to designate a wide variety of situations which conceivably might be differentiated from one another ethically. Thus the word refers both to the little military conflicts of the Renaissance city States—which might involve only a few thousand professional combatants operating in a relatively discriminating manner—and to modern military conflicts embracing whole peoples and using weapons which by their nature tend to be very non-discriminating (whatever the intentions of those who use them). Yet we apply "war" to both situations. In using the word, it is surely relevant, therefore, to keep in mind the widely different situations and contexts which it has designated.

Now in the continuum of types of force to which we have referred, the waging of war would clearly seem to be near the "violent force" end of the line. It involves the inevitable and deliberate killing of human beings, the wholesale destruction of material goods, and a tendency to be indiscriminate in the way it uses force. While there have been wide variations with respect to the degree of its discrinmation in the use of force, the twentieth century, most of us would agree, reveals war to have cast aside virtually all limits. Little attempt is made to discriminate between "guilty"

and "innocent," "combatants" and "non-combatants," and even if a serious attempt were made, the weapons used would tend to frustrate the attempt.

War in its inevitable contexts tends to lead to results never anticipated by those who utilize it. True, this is so in some measure of all complex organized action; but the large-scale violent force used in war, the subordination of men to a discipline more rigid than that of any other type of organization, the tendency to decrease sensitivity to human suffering, the lawless passions which war *expresses* as well as the destructive passions which it *unleashes,* the expedient actions and alliances into which men are forced in order to achieve a so-called "victory" —all these phenonena, and others as well, tend as means to contradict the kinds of ends (freedom and destruction of tyranny) for which war is usually proclaimed and to set up ends which differ widely from those envisaged. As Simone Weil has pointed out in her admirable essay *The Iliad: Poem of Force,* the tendency of the violence exemplified in war is to reduce human beings to mere things —the dead are indistinguishable from rocks and the living are simply instruments of death.

We are all familiar with the probable character of a future war as it has been sketched for us by those who should know. As much technological "progress," in terms of destructiveness of weapons, has been made between 1945 (the atomic bomb) and 1959 (hydrogen bombs and missiles) as was made between the American Civil War and the dropping of the first atomic bomb. A contemporary hydrogen bomb could wipe out a city of more than 300 square miles and make uninhabitable for a long time the area surrounding it. And with the development of missiles, the possibility of cold, calculating, and utterly wholesale destruction from a distance comes ever nearer. In fact, the British Ministry of Denfense, in a White Paper of unusual candor, said in 1957: "There is at present no means of providing adequate protection for the people of this country against the consequences of an attack by nuclear weapons." And Duncan Sandys, the Conservative Minister of Defense, commenting on this statement, asserted: "That is why we have taken a very bold step in deciding not to do the impossible. We decided not to defend the whole country, but to defend only our bomber bases. I must pay tribute to the people of Great Britain for the readiness with which they have accepted these harsh but inescapable facts."

Nor is this all. The mere preparation for war is so demanding, in terms of concentrated psychological and economic effort, that methods—and conceivably more efficacious methods—of non-violent action for good ends tend to be ruled out. Thus while it is in the abstract possible to combine a huge military budget with an equally large program of economic development, the psychological concomitants and commitments of preparation for war rule it out. Congress and the President have done little more than scratch the surface of peace-making through non-violent means, for their central faith is placed in the threat to use missiles and bombs.

These observations lead me to conclude that the complex of actions known as war and preparation for war (and it it is a delusion in the light of past experience to believe that we can prepare for war in the present context without getting war) is both immoral and powerless to achieve good ends. It is immoral because it involves organized and deliberate —and not primarily accidental—killing of human beings; and the prohibition of killing would seem to be as close as we can come to a moral "absolute" in this sub-angelic world. While the philosopher T. H. Green is technically correct when he asserts that war is not murder,[3] James Russell Lowell's

> Ez fer war, I call it murder,—
> There ye have it plain and flat

is not entirely inappropriate.

Its inexpediency strengthens my con-

viction that it is immoral. It is largely powerless to achieve good ends, except rather incidentally. Sometimes it does not even achieve very limited ends: thus Britain entered the war in 1939 avowedly, as Chamberlain told the House of Commons, "to preserve the integrity of Poland." This slogan began to have a hollow sound almost as soon as it was uttered—and the sound is even more hollow today. Even when war does achieve good objectives—as in the elimination of "National Socialist" power—it achieves them at such a cost and with such enormously evil by-products that its positive attainments are far more than counter balanced by its evil. Thus World War II undoubtedly facilitated the spread of tyrannical communism. War and the threat to use it are like producing roast pig through burning down houses, as in Lamb's famous essay: the pig is undoubtedly delicious (if one is not a vegetarian) but unfortunately it is bought at the cost of freezing to death the following night.

Nor do I think that the distinction between "aggressive" and "defensive" war is a valid one in terms of judging either morality or efficacy and expediency. In the first place, I know of no adequate method of distinguishing aggression from defense. In the second place, even if we could distinguish between aggressive and defensive war, the methods would be essentially the same—and it is the methods which are morally monstrous and practically ineffective and unrealistic.

Those national States which accept this line of analysis could, therefore, be consistent with their beliefs only by disarming unilaterally (failing multi-lateral agreement) and relying solely on non-violent force for their defense. The British naval commander Stephen King-Hall has actually proposed something like this in a recent book.[4] The States accepting this view would place their central reliance on programs of education, co-operative economic action, organized non-violent resistance, and, if necessary, a willingness to sacrifice standards of living in order that the under-developed areas of mankind might be assisted to live at more than a minimum level of existence. They would transform their military and naval academies into training centers for non-violent resistance leaders. They would spend at least as much for education and cultural development as they now spend for war. They would abolish their espionage and counter-espionage systems. Above all, they would transform their fundamental attitude: they would agree with Socrates that, if worse came to worst, it is better to suffer injustice than to commit it.

I do not think that a policy of this kind would afford any certainty that a people would not be enslaved, for it would be difficult to counteract past reliance on violence with a new faith in non-violent force. On the other hand, those who rely on violence and threats of violence cannot, on the basis of experience, have any great assurance either. Surely there is some validity in the New Testament saying "They who take the sword shall perish by the sword."[5] And the uncertainties of military conflict are well known. Over the course of centuries nations are "defeated" as frequently as they are "victorious."

But while both violence and non-violence have their uncertainties, I hold that a consistent policy of non-violence would set in motion forces of constructive change which would probably lead to competitive disarmament and certainly to a radically different temper in the world's politics. Somehow we must break through the cycle of violence and counter-violence. If the United States should become non-violent, for example, its real power for good would be far greater than it is now—for it would at long last be adapting its means to its avowed ends; and nothing is more powerful than a psychologically and spiritually integrated nation or person.

Even if a hostile military force occupied a disarmed and non-violent nation, the situation would still be preferable, both morally and in terms of so-called

expediency, to a war. Here I agree thoroughly with Bertrand Russell. A large part of mankind, if bad became worse, would probably survive at some level; and, as Russell argues persuasively, tyrannies do not last forever. Opportunities to struggle for freedom would still remain—as the experience of East Germany and Poland would seem to illustrate. But a war would almost certainly result in such destruction of life and disintegration of society that the few human beings who remained would be forced for a precarious survival to turn to government by tyrants. A policy of violence, in other words, will result in the probable destruction of the bulk of mankind *and* in the establishment and extension of tyranny among those who remain. A policy of complete reliance of non-violent resistance and non-violence *may* result in the destruction of tyranny where it exists now and at worst would lead to establishment of foreign tyranny among free peoples, with *relatively* little loss of human life and with the possibility of resisting the tyranny in the future.

The implications of all this for the individual seem to me clear: He will insist on international policies which lead to either multi-lateral or unilateral disarmament; he will proclaim his conviction that reliance on missiles and bombs for defense is a misplaced faith; he will be loyal to the *idea* of the State as an embodiment of order and therefore disloyal to the war-making historical State as the engine of disorder; he will seek to undermine the faith of men and women in preparation for war as a means of so-called defense; he will refuse personally to support military efforts; he will decline to make munitions of war; he will engage with men in other nations in an "open conspiracy" against war making governments everywhere; he will encourage women to give their moral support to men who take this stand; he will insist that tyrannies (including the undoubted Communist tyrannies) can be effectively opposed only by methods radically different from those which the tyrants use—methods which undermine the willingness of the agents of tyranny to obey their masters; he will seek to build an economic order which is not dependent on war preparation for its "success;" he will agitate among the young and teach them to revolt against the fatal tendency to accept the shopworn and unrealistic violence of their elders.

(4) *Christianity and the Christian Ethic.* We come now to our last question —that of the position of Christianity on force and war.

Here we might argue endlessly as to the definition of "Christianity." As a Quaker, for example, I should personally not regard myself as a Christian.

But perhaps we can make the question more explicit by asking (a) what is the attitude of the New Testament to war; (b) what was the position of the early Christians down to the end of the second century A.D.; (c) what has historical and institutional Christianity said about the subject; and (d) how, in the confusion attending the issue, should one personally interpret the ethic of the Gospels today?

(a) The attitude of the New Testament to war may be examined from two points of view: (1) what does its text say about the question; and (2) what would seem to be its spirit?

(1) Its text does not afford us any sure guidance. On the one hand, we have such statements as "He that takes the sword shall perish by the sword," "Put up thy sword, Peter," "Love your enemies," and "Overcome evil with good." On the other hand, we have equally difficult passages whose meaning is rather obscure: driving money-changers from the temple; the command on the road to Jerusalem to buy a sword; the refusal to condemn the occupation of soldiers; and the exhortation to pay taxes to Caesar—a large part of which went to support of war and preparation for war. Any literal interpretation of the text must, therefore, leave us rather puzzled.[6]

(2) As for the spirit of the New Testa-

ment, I think that the late Professor G.H.C. Macgregor was essentially right when he maintained that the outlook is one which can hardly be reconciled with the act of war. While it is true that we should always remember the eschatological context of much New Testament ethical teaching, the general conclusions of Macgregor would seem to remain unaffected.

(b) With respect to the attitude of early "Christians," it is seemingly true that during the first century and a half or more of the Christian epoch, "Christians" deemed war and the profession of soldier incompatible with their religious beliefs. Our leading authority here is the great German scholar Adolf Harnack, who tells us that no Christian would become a soldier after baptism at least up to the time of Marcus Aurelius.[7] Harnack contends that the chief reason for spurning the military profession was that "it was a war-calling, and Christianity had absolutely renounced war and the shedding of blood."

Throughout the century following Marcus Aurelius, this attitude continued to be maintained by most Christian apologists and by thousands of Christians as well. Even as late as 295 A.D., St. Maximilianus was martyred because he held to the ancient belief and refused to be conscripted into the army.

To cite all the evidence at this point would take us beyond our major purpose but the works of C. J. Cadoux[8] and of Harnack afford an abundant documentation.[9]

(c) The predominant teaching of historical so-called "Christianity" since the fourth century—as reflected in Church councils, the teaching of theologians, and the pronouncements of preachers—has held war to be legitimate under certain circumstances. In 314, the Church Council of Arles decreed that "they who throw away their weapons in time of peace shall be excommunicated." Harnack, himself a supporter of Prussian militarism, terms this decision "astonishing and shocking" and adds that by it "the Church completely revised her attitude to the army and war; . . . She even created saints on behalf of the Christian soldiers, and relegated to the monastic orders her old views about war."[10]

This acceptance of war as an institution was challenged only by a few heretics. And the major Protestant reformers agreed with the orthodox Athanasius that "Murder is not permitted, but to kill one's adversary in war is both lawful and praiseworthy."[11]

While historical Christianity developed the distinction between "just" and "unjust" wars, it was also militant in calling good Christians to slaughter their alleged enemies, as in the Crusades. Indeed, the sanction of Christianity gave support to wars which otherwise might never have been waged.

The most recent view from the predominant stream of institutional Christianity is to be found in a report of the Special Commission of the World Council of Churches, which, in August, 1958, concluded that a Christian could in conscience agree to the use of atomic arms in a "limited" war.[12] The Commission did add that "Christians should openly declare that the all-out use of these weapons should never be resorted to." It also said that Christians must oppose all policies giving evidence of leading to all-out conflict. But if such a war should break out, then they should urge a cease-fire, if necessary on the enemy's terms, and resort to non-violent resistence.

This report is difficult to interpret, but it is not untypical of the predominant position of historical Christianity as reflected through councils, popes, and ministers. Only a few sects have attempted to maintain something like the attitude which Christians took during the first two centuries.

(d) If one depart from the typical attitude of historic Christianity and ask oneself what the implications of the Gospel ethic may be today, I think there cannot be much doubt. It seems to me that the central ethic of Jesus is love;

that love implies non-killing, either of body or spirit; and that while it may not always be too clear what this ethic means in concrete cases, it would appear to be clearly incompatible with war and especially with war today—despite the efforts of men like Athanasius, St. Augustine, and Luther to prove the contrary. The ethic is not merely one of what Max Weber would call "absolute ends"; it is also one of "responsibility." It is one of principle and one also to which the utilitarian test can be applied. It is both morality and expediency—as those terms are popularly distinguished. "Sow the wind and reap the whirl-wind," Scripture admonishes us; and "by their fruits ye shall know them." By these particular tests, the act of violent force known as war stands condemned, regardless of the intentions or motives of those who use it.

But whatever the Gospels may or may not imply, the politics of pacifism is the only practical politics in our day; for it is the only politics which makes sense in a world grown ethically more nihilistic and politically all but insane.

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[1]New York *Times,* March 2, 1959. Professor Max Lerner was quoted recently as having said: "If the West gets cut off from access to Berlin, and we have to fight over it, the fighting will have to be nuclear and it will have to be started by us." *Survival,* v. I, No. 10, March 16, 1959.

[2]Gunnar Myrdal, *The American Dilemma.*

[3]*Principles of Political Obligation,* (1931), p. 160. Green's words are: "The essence of murder does not lie in the fact that one man takes away the life of another, but that he does this to 'gain his private ends' and with 'malice' against the person killed."

[4]Stephen King-Hall, *Defense in the Nuclear Age.*

[5]The philosopher E. A. Burtt rightly suggests that we need a social science investigation which would test the validity of this hypothesis. E. A. Burtt, "The Value Presuppostions of Science," *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,* v. XIII, No. 3, March, 1957.

[6]For a detailed examination of the problem see G.H.C. Macgregor, *The New Testament Basis of Pacifism.*

[7]Adolf Harnack, *Militia Christi,* p. 47 f. Marcus Aurelius reigned from 161 to 180 A.D.

[8]Particularly *The Early Church and the World.*

[9]Note some of the classical statements on the subject during the first three centuries and a half of our era:

Origen: "We Christians no longer take up sword against nation, nor do we learn to make war any more, having become children of peace, for the sake of Jesus who is our leader." *Contra Celsum.*

Cyprian protests against a morality which would bring it about that "if a murder is committed privately it is a crime, but if it happens with State authority courage is the name for it." *Epistles,* 1, 6.

Lactantius, in the fourth century: "It will not be lawful for a just man to serve as a soldier, for justice itself is his military service, nor to accuse anyone of a capital offense because it makes no difference whether thou kill with a sword or with a word, since killing itself is forbidden. And so, in this commandment of God, no exception at all ought to be made to the rule that it is always wrong to kill a man, whom God had wished to be regarded as a sacrosanct creature." *Divinae Institutions,* VI, 20, 15-17.

[10]*Militia Christi, p.* 92.

[11]*Epistle to Ammonius.*

[12]N. Y. *Times,* August 23, 1958.

WAR AND WESTERN CIVILIZATION: A REJOINER TO PROFESSOR KENDALL

MULFORD Q. SIBLEY

As Professor Kendall has indicated, he and I have known each other for several years. We have had many an argument but have continued to remain personal friends. I have always admired his learning.

His remarkably interesting paper certainly deserves more extensive analysis and comment than can be provided here.

As I read Professor Kendall's paper, it maintains that (1) there is a "Western Civilization" which, while changing, still develops within certain major premises that remain constant; (2) Christian pacifism is heretical within the Western Christian tradition and "by that very token" is "a sign of barbarism in our midst"; (3) the orthodox Christian view has developed the doctrine of the "just war" "which we may safely cite as one of Western Civilization's major defenses against the heretical preachments of the pacifists"; and (4) by contrast with the orthodox view, pacifism wrongly insists "that Christian history fails to reveal any instance of war achieving the ends for which it was waged."

After examining each of these propositions in turn, I should like to conclude with a brief recapitulation of the main points in my own paper.

(1) *"Western Civilization."* Now we may agree, I think, that there is a "Western Civilization" without necessarily assenting to all of the assertions which Professor Kendall makes about it and about men's attitude to it. We can agree, for example, that it is a fusion of Greek and Hebraic-Christian elements; and we can furthermore accept much of Mr. Kendall's description of its contents. But beyond this, Kendall makes claims which are far too sweeping and seems, moreover, to contradict himself in the process. Granted, for example, that most men and women who have lived in the past would agree with his position on pacifism, by virtue of what powers does he claim to predict the allegiance of men and women who are not yet born? Yet he makes such a claim: "I address myself to 'we', meaning by 'we' the overwhelming majority of the people of Western civilization, past, present, and future . . ." This is a particularly astonishing claim in light of the fact that he seems to take it back toward the end of his paper when he warns us that "Christian pacifists" may increase enormously in numbers. And he proceeds to warn Christians "not to let this happen." What becomes of his assurance, then, that the overwhelming majority of men in the future will continue to accept the premises associated with "Western civilization"? He appears to give away his case. At the outset he confidently asserts that men *will not* accept the claims of pacifism; at the end, he warns of the dire peril inherent in the real possibility that they *may* do so.

The pacifist, whether Christian or not, can only be thankful to Mr. Kendall for admitting the genuine possibility of what pacifism holds to be a crying need—that men re-examine many traditional premises and discard some of them. Men are capable of doing this and, in fact, have done it in the past. Thus Christians by the fourth century had given up their "pacifist" attitude and had embraced a "non-pacifist" one. What early Christians did in one direction, modern Christians (and those shaped by a "Christian" civilization) can do and ought to do in the other, so the pacifist would hold. Granted for the moment that Mr. Kendall's description of "Western civilization" is essentially correct, we do not

as human beings have to be bound body and soul by the short-sightedness and obtuseness of our ancestors. For it is clear that, in some respects at least, our ancestors were *wrong*.

(2) *Pacifism as "Heretical."* Mr. Kendall and I are agreed that throughout most so-called Christian history "pacifism" has been "heretical." But we do differ sharply at one point. Mr. Kendall asserts that early Christians refused to enter the army "not because they regarded the recourse to arms as evil, but because as Roman soldiers they would have to burn incense to the gods." I pointed out in my paper that the best authorities on this subject—notably Adolf Harnack and C. J. Cadoux—flatly disagree with Mr. Kendall. While they do not deny that repudiation of idolatry was a factor leading Christians to repudiate army service (along with opposition to capital punishment and other considerations), I quoted Harnack to the effect that a major reason for spurning the military profession was that "Christianity had absolutely renounced war and the shedding of blood." And since Harnack was anything but a pacifist himself he can hardly be accused of reading his own views into those of the early Christians.

But let us deal a little more fully with "Christian pacifism" as "heresy"—which I said it had been since 314 A.D. Let me re-state the position of my paper and then comment upon some of Mr. Kendall's assertions.

The pacifism I support is primarily moral, and "religious" in the generic sense of that term—it is not specifically "Christian," as I understand the meaning of that word. I repudiate many expressions of Christian "heretical" pacifism to which Mr. Kendall refers: I do not accept the Manichaeans' identification of the material universe with evil, for example; nor do I think of pacifism as passive "non-resistance" as that term is understood by some Christian "heretics." As was emphasized in my paper, I think physical force *can* be used for morally opproved ends; indeed, much genuine Christian pacifism would not repudiate use of physical force as such.

Now let us deal with Mr. Kendall's specifics. While he admits that pacifism appeals to the "Christian doctrine of love," he thinks that it is really "the very negation of that love." He apparently holds this because he thinks pacifism is "marked throughout by irresponsibility and callous indifference towards the wants and needs and rights of the pacifists' fellow-men." It is true that some Christian pacifists seem to suggest that consequences should not be considered and to the degree that they do hold this, I agree with Mr. Kendall that they can be held to be "irresponsible"—just as those non-pacfists are "irresponsible" who say we must resist tyranny and assume without question that war can in fact contribute to this end. But surely a very large proposition of "Christian pacifists" are acutely aware of their responsibility—they repudiate war and violent force in large part precisely because these means *do not* protect the values they hold dear.

Mr. Kendall says that the pacifist is a "parasite." It is not quite clear just what he means by this term but presumably he is suggesting that the pacifist accepts the benefits of war without being willing to undergo its responsibilities. But always the pacifist will ask: "What benefits?" Far from being parasitical, the pacifist feels he is making a contribution to "civilization" by puncturing the illusion that war—even as a "last resort"—defends "civilization" from any "barbarian," Communist or otherwise. The pacifist provides the same kind of service rendered by the little child who, in Hans Christian Anderson's well-known tale, shouts out to a deluded and half-hypnotized people, "But the Emperor has nothing on!"

(3) *"The Just War."* Mr. Kendall makes much of the "just war" doctrine developed by Catholic theologians from Augustine to Suarez. I, too, admire it in many respects. It is an attempt to wrestle with the problem of "limits"—to harness

force to morally approved ends. But even within the premises of the "just war" tradition we might note:

(a) The fact that God (the author of natural law) cannot be held to "*will* and *not will* political society" is not necessarily an argument supporting the legitimacy of war. For the pacifist will say that even though God must be assumed to will the means necessary to preserve the *principle* of political society, the question always is "What means are appropriate and efficacious for that end?" It is here that the pacifist cites experience, particularly modern experience, to show that war, while it may preserve a given historic "State," creates so much *disorder* in the process that it tends to be both ethically and politically nihilistic. Pacifists are pacifists, in part at least, precisely because they do value *order;* and they believe that resort to the violence of war—under any probable modern circumstances—will always give rise to greater disorder than order.

(b) While the "just war" doctrine supports the legitimacy of some wars, both "defensive" and "aggressive," not a few modern Catholics hold that the conditions necessary to make a war "just" can never be found in modern wars. These Catholics, therefore, become pacifists *because* they are doctrinally "orthodox" (in what I believe is Mr. Kendall's sense of the term). To quote an eminent Catholic scholar,[1] these Catholics, both laymen and priests, "hold that one of the requirements of a just war, the suitableness of the means of war to the purpose of war, cannot be met today." War has become so indiscriminate, they contend, that a "balance" between means and ends cannot be achieved.[2]

I call Mr. Kendall's attention to this, not to assert that most proponents of the "just war" doctrine would interpret it in this manner today, but to emphasize that a number accepting the premises of that doctrine have reached the conclusion that they *must* be pacifists *if they are to support* the doctrine. Querry to Mr. Kendall: Are they, too, "heretics" and "parasites" and "barbarians"?

(4) *Has War Ever Achieved Its Ends in "Christian History"?* It is not too profitable to speculate what *would have happened* had "Christians" not resisted "evil" through war. But since Mr. Kendall has asked us to do it, let us comment briefly.

Most reflecting pacifists will not assert that war has never achieved any of the objectives for which it was allegedly fought. What they do maintain is that any ends attained were most probably bought at a price more than counter balancing the gains.

Take the eighth century battle of Tours, in which Charles Martel halted what Mr. Kendall calls the "Mohammedan barbarians." It is often asked what would have happened had Christians not resisted the Moslems by military violence. Did not the battle of Tours "save" Christian civilization? At the time, of course, there was not much "civilization" to "save." It is not at all improbable that had the Moslems triumphed the civilization of western Europe would have reached a higher level more rapidly than it did under the Christians. Moslems were at least as civilized as the Christians of that period and it is an understatement to say that they were more tolerant in religious matters. We often fail to remember that it was Moslem culture which gave great impetus to the revival of Greek learning in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. It was thus in part responsible for St. Thomas Aquinas and the other eminent men of whom Mr. Kendall is so justly fond. This stimulus to Western culture might have come earlier had Christians not pushed back the Moslems at Tours. A Moslem Europe, moreover, would probably have saved the world from the Inquisition—that "Christian" institution which cast its pall over men's minds and bodies for so many years.

Mr. Kendall mentions Marlborough. What did all his fighting accomplish? Who remembers what the battle of Blen-

heim was all about and what did it do except kill some thousands of men and prevent other thousands from being born? The most appropriate comment is to quote Southey's famous poem:

"And everybody praised the Duke,
Who this great fight did win."
"But what good came of it at last?"
Quoth little Peterkin.
"Why, that I cannot tell," said he;
"But 'twas a famous victory."

Space forbids our considering other "what might have beens." I would only say in conclusion that at least as good an argument can be made that men should not have fought in the vast majority of historic wars as that they were right in fighting—solely in terms of probable long-run results and aside from the question as to whether it is ever right to engage in acts which inevitably result in the taking of human life.

Let me now recapitulate what I have said about my general viewpoint.

It is not a peculiarly "Christian" pacifist position, although some versions of "Christian" pacifism are not incompatible with it. In terms of basic framework, Mr. Kendall and I seem to differ in that while his point of departure is "orthodox" Catholic Christian teaching, mine is not specifically Christian. This does not mean, I hope, that I am unaware of a great debt to what is called the Christian tradition.

I have argued that the problem of violence is a central issue of our day; that violence is to be distinguished from non-violent force; and that non-violent "external" force (physical or non-physical) is permissible (although not the ideal) for the achievement of ends. The distinction between non-violent and violent force turns on context, probable consequences, controllability, and similar factors. While it is sometimes difficult to distinguish between violent and non-violent force, war is surely an example of force at the "violence" end of the continuum; and it is therefore barred to those who would act morally and achieve such goals as freedom, democracy, and order.

Having repudiated war as a method of resisting tyranny, we must find efficacious and moral means of defense. Besides greater reliance on full development of international agencies, those means are to be discovered in techniques of non-violent resistance; in large-scale acts of positive economic development, even to the extent of national sacrifice; in unilateral disarmament, if multi-lateral disarmament cannot be achieved soon; and in personal repudiation by individuals of the act of war and preparation for war.

In my judgment, a position of this kind can be sustained without any recourse to "Christianity." But is also seems to me in thorough conformity with the spirit of the Gospels.

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[1]Heinrich A. Rommen, *The State in Catholic Thought* (St. Louis: B. Herder, 1947), 648.

[2]This view was propounded at least as early as 1924 by the very respectable Catholic scholar Father Stratmann, O.P., in *Weltkirche u. Weltfriede.* And since that time it has been repeated and elaborated by others. Some associated with the Catholic Worker movement in the United States would accept it, for example.

PROFESSOR KENDALL'S REBUTTAL

We now know about the particular variant of pacifism that Professor Sibley is urging upon us. The American people are to begin, forthwith, to master the techniques of "non-violent resistence," in the expectation of using them, to the exclusion of all techniques of violent resistance, against any future invader. Professor Sibley does not, as I understand it, assure us that the techniques will "work" —that is, put the invader (e.g., Khrushchëv) to shame, so that he will give up and go home. ("I do not think," he confesses, "that a policy of this kind would afford any certainty that a people would not be enslaved.") But he does assure us that enslavement—*our* enslavement, that is—is "preferable, both morally and in terms of so-called expediency," to a war fought for the purpose of repelling and crushing the invader, as also that enslavement won't, after all, be too bad. ("A large part of mankind," he tells us, "would probably survive at some level [!] . . . [Tyrannies] do not last forever. Opportunities to sruggle for freedom would still remain—as the experience of East Germany and Poland [but not, let us note, Hungary—or Tibet] would seem to illustrate.") There are, in a word, some "uncertainties" here, but never mind: ". . . a consistent policy of non-violence would set in motion forces of constructive change which would . . . *certainly* lead to a radically different temper in the world's politics" (iltalics mine). The "real power for good" of the United States—"far greater than it is now," since the country "would at long last be adapting its means to its avowed ends; and nothing is more powerful in the psychological sense [!] than an integrated nation" [We'd be "integrated", never fear!] . . . —As for the other alternative, the war fought to the death in defence of Western Civilization, the uncertainties wear pretty thin here too: it "would *almost certainly* result in such destruction of life and disintegration of society that the few human beings who remained would be forced for a precarious survival to turn to the government of tyrants (italics mine)." And then thinner still: "A policy of violence . . . *will* result in the *probable* destruction of the bulk of mankind and in the establishment and extension of tyranny among those who remain (italics mine)." (It *is* a difficult problem; let us not be too severe with him if he gets a little confused.)

That, then, is what Professor Sibley would have us do, and those the proximate reasons why we should do it. When, however, we ask him for the reasons, that is, for the ultimate bases of his position, empirical and moral, the certainties crumble into uncertainties just as, a moment ago, the uncertainties transmuted themselves into virtual certainties. Why is Professor Sibley so certain that nuclear weapons will actually be used in any future war with the USSR? He does not say, or even pause to notice that those amongst us who are most learned in military affairs now lean to the view that they will not be used. (If they will not, the total destruction upon which his argument appears to rely so heavily will not, of course, occur.) Is he saying that our obligation not to resist arises directly from the new weapons-systems and their aweful destructiveness, or is his point rather that violence has *always* been self-defeating, back through the ages to the beginning of time? Evidently now the one and now the other, as suits his immediate rhetorical purpose. On what grounds does he speak of the elimination of Nazism, which is the good some of us think "we" accomplished in World War II, as "temporary"—because such a contention is necessary to his position, or because he has evidence, which for whatever reason he withholds from us, with which to justify that way of putting it? As for the alleged cult of violence and

the alleged trigger-happiness about war in non-pacifist circles, especially official circles, what is Professor Sibley's answer to the contention, with which he is surely familiar, that but for our quasi-pacifist *inhibitions* about the use of force, the rise of Soviet power since World War II could easily have been checked (as, in its day, that of Nazism could have been checked too)? Did the promised benefits of non-resistance accrue to the German and Eastern European Jews whom the Nazis slaughtered by the millions, and if not why not, and was this another case where the "means" used by non-pacifists were not adapted to their "ends"? The millions of Russians who are today in Communist prison camps—do they go down in Professor Sibley's book as resisters, as agents of violence or as examples of those meek who will one day inherit the earth? and what will one day free them, Professor Sibley's pacifism, or the "shopworn and unrealistic violence" that he decries? If there is the appearance of certainty on the empirical side of Professor Sibley's argument, it is a spurious certainty, which proceeds by ignoring all facts inconvenient to his position, and all countervailing argument that might be difficult to meet. Professor Sibley does not wish to discuss; he wishes to debate.

As for the moral bases of his position, I search in vain for these also—and for the excellent reasons that Professor Sibley is, clearly, searching for them himself, and under the unhappiest of unhappy auspices. As the opening minutes of his address indicate, he is far gone in sin against the Twelfth Commandment, that according to Auden, namely: "Thou shalt not commit a social science." He must, therefore, force whatever he has to say about morality into the fashionable "values" jargon—"values" being goods that are good not because they are good but because "we" value them, that is, like them, give our assent to them. Not all of us to the same "values," however: Alas! All God's chillun got values, and "we"—each of us, in Burke's phrase, put to trade on his own private stock of reason—must choose among the many alternatives offered to us, besides which after "we" have chosen we must then arrange "our" values in a "hierarchy." As Professor Sibley rightly insists, all that takes some doing (once you are committed to doing it at all); orthodoxy cannot help (it is just one competing set, or perhaps several competing sets, of "values"); tradition can't help, for the same reason; authority —perish the thought!—cannot help (for don't opinions differ as to whose authority you turn to? must not the sovereign individual "choose" here also?). Like everyone else who is pursuing that *ignis fatui,* Professor Sibley bogs down in the surrounding swamps: "We must not expect too much from our inquiry," he reminds himself, as well a man may who is bogged down in a swamp, "however deeply we *feel* that *our* reason is the right one (as I do)" (italics mine). And, since he who expects little is rarely disappointed, Professor Sibley ends up with "not too much" in the way of morality: "the achievement of political freedom, the preservation and enhancement of human life, and the maintenance of moral sensitivity." That is, with a *maimed* morality, which leaves out most of the interesting problems, and can cheerfully bid us to "achieve" political freedom by delivering ourselves into slavery ("tyrannies," remember, "don't last forever"), to "preserve" and "enhance" human life by acquiescing in the continued existence of the Soviet prison-camps (and, retrospectively, in the extermination of the European Jews), and to "maintain" "moral" "sensitivity" by frustrating the efforts of our neighbors to defend themselves. (As the French say in that famous joke, *Quelle sensibilité!* If our neighbors are enslaved, "opportunities to struggle for freedom would still remain." No wonder Professor Sibley can speak, and speak seriously, of "ideals" common to Christians and Communists!

As for that part of our topic that reads "Christian or Unchristian?" Professor Sibley's position seems to me to border on the incomprehensible. Is the question

(whether force is Christian) worth discussing? For Professor Sibley personally, it would seem, only as an academic exercise ("As Quaker I should . . . not regard myself as a Christian"). Mightn't he at least lend a helping hand to those who are Christians, and lack his skill at finding his way through the intricacies of the problem? He is not unwilling, but also, I fear, not very helpful ("we might argue endlessly as to the definition of 'Christianity' "); "the New Testament . . . does not afford us any sure guidance [about war]," but then also it *does* offer us sure guidance, since "If one ask oneself what the implications of the New Testament ethic may be, I cannot see that there can be much doubt [:] . . . the central ethic of Jesus is love; that love implies non-killing [that is, pacifism?]").

Why have so many Christians misunderstood the New Testament on this point? Well, we must distinguish between Christianity (i.e., Christianity as construed by Mulford Sibley) and that old complex of errors that learned men call "historic Christianity" (those old saints, those old glose-writers, "men like Athanasius, St. Augustine, and Luther," those old "councils, popes, and ministers"). Professor Sibley's Christianity, like Professor Sibley's morality, is what he, given his "values," *likes;* as his morality, divorced as it is from religion, is without sanctions, so his Christianity, divorced as it is from tradition and authority, is without status save as he confers status upon it by his assent to it.

We do not need to unmask Professor Sibley. He unmasks himself.